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Chapter 12
Asset Allocation within Variable Annuities:
The Impact of Guarantees
Moshe A. Milevsky and Vladyslav Kyrychenko

Variable annuities (VAs) are close cousins of mutual funds, which bundle
individual securities such as stocks and bonds into diversified units or
trusts. Nevertheless, they are formally classified as insurance policies, since
they are sold by insurance companies and contain insurance guarantees,
in addition to being registered as securities. The most recent generation
of variable annuity contracts has been financially engineered to provide
a range of income guarantees meant to protect the policyholder against
what the industry has coined the ‘sequence of returns’ risk. This refers to
the chance that a retirement portfolio from which cash is being withdrawn
suffers early losses. The common denominator of all these insurance riders
is that they contain an implicit put option on financial markets plus some
form of longevity insurance, akin to a pure life annuity. Of course, using
the concept of put-call parity, they can also be viewed as call options to
annuitize at a variable strike price. It is estimated that ∼70 to 80 percent of
VAs currently sold contain these living benefit riders, for a total of around
$100 billion.
The promotional material for such products often claims that these guarantees should induce purchasers to take on more financial risk than they
normally would without these guarantees. In fact, some of these products
are referred to as a ‘bond substitute’ within a diversified portfolio, or even
as a risk-free instrument. This chapter explores these new products using a
unique database of policyholder behavior supplied by the Life Insurance
Marketing Research Association (LIMRA). We show that VA policyholders are indeed adopting more aggressive allocations (i.e., higher equity
exposures) when these riders are actually selected. We also examine the
theoretical merits of this advice by deriving the optimal asset allocation—
under a stylized model of these products—in the presence of these optional
riders.1
In what follows, we review some of the relevant academic literature on
the topic of portfolio choice over the life cycle. Next, we describe our data
and provide summary results. The subsequent section provides an analytic
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model of portfolio choice in the presence of these guarantees, and a section
offers conclusions and additional observations.

Background
As of early 2007, over US $1.2 trillion has been invested in VAs in the
USA, with gross annual sales in the hundred billion dollar range; clearly
it is a substantial market. VAs have long provided tax-sheltered growth
and deferral; currently they also embed a number of put-like derivatives
that provide guarantees on the account value. Like all insurance riders,
and in contrast to standard exchange traded options, insurance companies
charge for this downside protection by deducting an ongoing fraction of
assets as opposed to an up-front fee. These unique features differentiate the
pricing of this derivative security from the standard Black-Scholes approach
where the option premiums are paid up front and in advance. (This will be
important later when we examine optimal portfolio allocations.)
In what follows, we focus on a type of rider called the Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit (GMIB). The mechanics of this option are explained
analytically below, but for now it is important to know that the essence
of a GMIB consists of a market put option that allows the holder of the
VA to annuitize the account at a guaranteed rate—which then provides a
guaranteed level of lifetime income.2 At the point of purchase, the investor
may select the GMIB; this rider gives the holder the ability to annuitize
some minimally guaranteed amount at some contractually guaranteed rate.
Thus, for example, if a $10,000 premium were placed into a variable annuity, the insurance company might guarantee that at least $15,000 worth of
life-annuity income can be purchased in 10 years. The purchase price (or
annuity factor) would be specified within the contract, for example $20
per dollar of lifetime income. Thus this contract would guarantee a life
annuity of $15,000/$20 = $750 per year in the worst case scenario; if the
market value of the (subaccounts within the) variable annuity were worth
more than $15,000 in 10 years, the policyholder could annuitize the market
value at market annuity rates.
A number of recent papers have extended the set of decisions included
in the portfolio choice problem to highlight the interaction and the risks
faced by the household, broadly defined.3 The common denominator in
these studies, and an oft-debated question, is how portfolio allocations to
risky assets (stocks) should evolve with investors’ age. Finance practitioners often recommend lowering the equity content of one’s portfolio with
increasing age. Much of this is at the heart of the life-cycle funds recently
promoted by many mutual fund companies. A popular rule of thumb is to
have the share of equities equal to 100 minus the investor’s age.
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By contrast, academic analysts have built on Merton’s classical result
(1969, 1971) that age should not matter in the absence of human capital
considerations. Several authors who include human capital in their models
by and large support the recommendation to decrease equity share in
the portfolio with increasing age, although the generated profiles are not
necessarily monotonic.4 Other stylized facts have also emerged regarding
the determinants of the optimal equity share in investors’ portfolios with
age. For instance, most document the importance of a declining age-equity
share profile.5 Others document a hump-shaped pattern, with a declining
part starting at the ages of 50–60.6

Empirical Methods
In what follows, we use data containing VA policy purchase information
on 812,367 individual variable annuity contracts collected by LIMRA. That
organization gathered contract and product information from 10 member
life-insurance firms which sold variable annuity policies during the period
January 2000–June 2004; these policies had to be in force as of June 2004
and had to offer at least one guaranteed living benefit (GLB) rider at
the time of purchase. This data-set has several advantages compared to
commonly used financial micro-level survey information such as the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). First, LIMRA’s data-set has a definite size advantage, as it provides information on more than 812,000 annuity contracts. In comparison,
PSID follows only about 8,000 families while the SCF contacts some 4,000
households in its triennial surveys. Second, LIMRA’s information comes
directly from insurance firms’ original contracts, so they are much more
accurate than self-reported information from household surveys. Third,
the LIMRA data provide much greater detail with respect to asset allocation
choices (e.g., amounts invested in small-cap, medium-cap, large-cap, or
international stock funds, investment grade or high-yield bond funds, and
balanced funds). Finally, and most importantly, the LIMRA data are unique
in providing information for asset allocation within variable annuities with
and without GLB riders.
Of course, as Campbell (2006) points out, there is no perfect source of
household financial data. To this end, the LIMRA data do not include comprehensive information about investors’ personal characteristics and other
investment accounts. What the LIMRA files do provide is some 60 variables
about investor and contract characteristics including the investor’s age, sex,
and state of residence. We also have data on the investor’s account value
and how it is invested, the distribution intermediary channel, whether a
GLB rider was selected, and the features of each type of GLB rider. Records
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were eliminated with missing age information and those records for which
the values of different sub-accounts did not add up to the account value;
this reduced our sample from 812,367 to 679,579 observations. We further
limit our sample to those investors who (a) either selected no GLB rider or
(b) selected the GMIB only. We do this for two reasons. First, the GMIB is
the closest equivalent to a life annuity with longevity insurance [compared
to other GLB riders, such as the Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefit
(GMWB) or Guaranteed Minimum Accumulation Benefit (GMAB)]. Second, the GMIB is by far the most popular GLB rider selected by individuals.
Of all contacts we examined, where at least one GLB rider was selected, only
a GMIB was selected 95 percent of the time. These exclusions produce a
‘clean’ data-set of 660,336 observations with either GMIB or no GLB riders
selected.

Empirical Findings
Next, we describe the relationship between age and asset allocation for
investors who selected GMIBs, compared to those who did not select any
GLB. More specifically, we consider the percentage of the investor’s VA
account held in high and medium risk (HMR) assets, which we describe
below as ‘risky assets,’ as a function of the investor’s age. The following
funds are included in the HMR category: large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap
stock funds, high-yield bond fund, balanced fund, specialty/sector fund,
and international equity fund. Conversely low risk (LR) investments are
those held in investment-grade bond funds, money-market funds, and fixed
funds.
Next, we analyze the two companies referred to here as companies A and
B with the highest number of annuity policies in our sample, 170,462 and
126,118 annuity contracts, respectively. These two companies combined
represent 52 percent of VAs with selected GMIBs in the LIMRA sample.
Figure 12-1 and Table 12-1 describe the percentages invested in HRM assets
by age groups. In both cases, we present two age versus HMR results: one
for investors who selected GMIB and another for those who selected no
GLB rider. For company A, for example, investors who did not select any
GLB rider have a declining percentage invested in HMR assets by age. The
decline is almost monotonic, from 77 percent for the under-age 40 group,
to 54 percent for the over-age 80 group. A very different profile emerges for
investors who selected GMIB: here, the percentage invested in HMR assets
declines with age much more slowly to age 71–75, and then it starts to rise.
The GMIB group’s exposure to HMR assets is much higher, being in the
80–86 percent range. We conclude that additional HMR (risk) exposure in
the group of GMIB selectors in company A is between 11 and 31 percent.
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100%
A: GMIB selected
A: No GLB selected
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B: No GMIB selected
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Figure 12-1. Allocation to risky assets, with and without GMIB option.
Source: Authors’ computations. Note: This figure displays the percent of the variable
annuity sub-account within the policy sold by Companies A and B allocated to high
and medium risk (HMR) asset classes, when the GMIB is selected and when no
Guaranteed Living Benefit (GLB RIDER) is selected.

The impact of age on the HMR allocation graph is similar for company
B. The allocation to risky assets for investors who selected a GMIB is substantially higher and again declines with age much more slowly than for
investors not selecting a GLB rider. Interestingly, the total share of assets
invested in HMR assets is significantly lower for company B than for A at all
age groups. Furthermore, in company B, for investors who selected GMIB,
this share is very stable regardless of age. These differences are probably
attributable to the different investment choices available in each company,
as well as to different asset allocation restrictions applied when a GMIB
rider is selected. Additional HMR exposure in the group of GMIB selectors
in company B is between 5 and 18 percent.
Finally, Figure 12-2 illustrates how the selection of HMR versus LR assets
varies with the distribution channel. What we mean by distribution channel
is the type of intermediary selling the variable annuity product to the
customer. The patterns show stark differences in the HMR equity exposure,
both with and without the selection of the GMIB, depending on whether
the VA was purchased through a bank, an independent financial adviser, a
wirehouse broker, or some other source. For example, in company A, policies with the highest allocation to risky assets, with or without a GMIB, were
sold by financial planners. Policies sold through banks have the biggest
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Table 12-1 Fraction of Variable Annuity Portfolio Held in High or Medium Risk
(HMR) Assets
Investor Age

Company A
% in HMR

≤40
41–45
46–50
51–55
56–60
61–65
66–70
71–75
76–80
>80
Total no. of
policies

GMIB
only

No GLB
RIDER

86.90
85.30
84.60
83.80
82.40
82.00
82.10
81.60
79.70
77.50

76.30
73.10
70.60
66.70
62.20
59.00
58.30
59.30
61.90
46.70

104,377

66,085

Company B
Additional
HMR
Exposure
(%)
10.60
12.20
14.00
17.10
20.30
23.00
23.80
22.20
17.80
30.80

% in HMR
GMIB
only

No GLB
RIDER

67.80
67.80
67.60
67.90
67.60
67.30
67.10
66.80
67.60
N/A

62.80
62.20
61.70
59.90
54.90
51.10
50.00
48.70
51.10
46.40

89,949

36,169

Additional
HMR
Exposure
(%)
5.00
5.60
5.90
8.00
12.70
16.10
17.20
18.10
16.40
N/A

Source: Authors’ computations, see text.
Notes: This table presents the percentage invested in high and medium risk (HMR) assets
for Companies A and B, for 10 age groups in five year groupings. The first column for
each company represents the percentage allocation to HMR by investors who selected a
Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit (GMIB); the second column represents allocation
to HMR by those who did not select any guaranteed living benefit (GLB rider). The table
shows that VA policyholders hold more HMR assets when they select a GMIB. For company
A, this ranges from 10–30%; for company B this ranges from 5–16%. Note that in the case
of company B, contracts were not issued above the age of 80. The HMR allocations are not
directly comparable across companies due to different investment options.

difference between the percentages allocated to HMR for investors who
selected GMIB compared to those who did not. In company B, the VAs
with the highest HMR allocations (where no GLB rider was selected) were
sold by stockbrokers, while the policies which included GMIBs were sold
by financial planners. Here the largest gap in allocations to risky assets was
in the policies sold by stockbrokers. Of course, this is not to say that the
any of the channels necessarily influence or cause the particular allocation
differences, as this could arise from differences in the clientele. People who
are more ‘conservative’ and hence likely to hold less HMR assets might be
more likely to purchase the VA through a bank, and vice versa. In our view,
the most likely explanation for the asset allocation distribution channel
effect is likely to be the type of customer who uses these intermediaries, as
opposed to the intermediaries themselves.
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Company B: Allocation to HMR
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Figure 12-2. How distribution channel influences risky allocation. Source: Authors’
computations. Notes: Funds regarded as high or medium risk include large-cap,
mid-cap, and small-cap stock funds, high yield bond fund, balanced fund, specialty/sector fund, international equity fund. The rest of the fund classes available
(including investment-grade bond fund, money-market fund, and fixed fund) are
considered as low-risk assets. The HMR allocations are not directly comparable
across companies due to different investment options. Variable annuities manufactured by Companies A and B can be purchased via several distribution channels including career insurance agents (CAREER), stockbrokers (STBR, including
wirehouses), financial planners (FINPL), and banks. The two panels illustrate the
impact of this distribution channel on the allocation to HMR assets, both with and
without guarantees. Panel A: Company A’s allocation to high and medium risk
(HMR) assets. Panel B: Company B’s allocation to high and medium risk (HMR)
assets.
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Multivariate Statistical Analysis
Next, we evaluate whether the relationship between age and HMR assets
holdings observed in our previous tabulations is robust to controls for
other variables. Accordingly, we employ a linear regression model where
the dependent variable is the percentage invested in HMR assets. Control
variables include the investor’s age, as well as several others including age
squared (AGE2 ), to capture possible nonlinearities. We also control on the
log of the investor’s account value (LOGACC) as a proxy for investor’s
wealth; prior studies have reported that wealthier investors have more
aggressive asset allocations. The investor’s sex (MALE) is included as previous research has indicated that men tend to be more overconfident than
women and so may invest proportionally more in risky assets. A qualitative
variable (IRA) captures the tax status of the account. Since investments
inside IRAs are tax sheltered, we might expect to see a higher share of
fixed income assets in those accounts because interest income is taxed at
a higher rate than dividends or capital gains on stocks. Of course, variable
annuities are already tax-sheltered investments, so theoretically it should
not make a difference in terms of the tax implications. Following our
earlier discussion, we include a control for the distribution channel, or the
intermediary by which the variable annuity contract was purchased. Four
qualitative variables (CAREER, STBR, FINPL, and BANK) indicate, respectively, that the sale was made via an insurance agent, stockbroker, financial
planner, or bank employee (the reference category is independent agent).
These are included to allow for the possible impact and influence of the
intermediary on the percentage of risky assets selected. Finally, we allow
for company-specific controls by including seven company indicator variables for those firms that sold VA policies with GMIB riders (the omitted
category is the three companies with the lowest number of VA contracts
with GMIB.)
Linear regression results are presented for two subsamples: one includes
only variable annuity contracts without any GLB rider (Model 1), and
the second includes only those contracts where variable annuity holders
selected a particular type of GLB rider, namely, the GMIB (Model 2).
Table 12-2 summarizes findings. Most importantly, the negative coefficient
on AGE indicates that the share invested in risky assets declines with age for
both subsamples. Nevertheless, it declines much faster for those investors
who did not select any GLB rider, as the AGE coefficient in Model 1 is
three times larger (in absolute value) than in Model 2; their difference is
highly significant based on t-test.7 Moreover, AGE2 coefficient is negative
in Model 1 but positive in Model 2. This suggests that the share invested in
risky assets is a concave function of age which declines faster at older ages
for investors who do not select any GLB rider. For those who select GMIB
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Table 12-2 Factors Associated with the Fraction of the VA Account
Held in High or Medium Risk (HMR) Assets: Multivariate
Regression Results
Variable

With GMIB
Estimate

Intercept
LOGACC
MALE
AGE
AGE2
IRA
CAREER
STBR
FINPL
BANK
C1
C2
C3
C7
C8
C9
C10
Adjusted R2
No. of observations

0.913∗
−0.002∗
0.012∗
−0.002∗
1.8E–06∗
−0.004∗
−0.039∗
0.011∗
0.003
−0.058∗
−0.133∗
0.038∗
0.088∗
0.029∗
−0.049∗
−0.073∗
0.106∗
0.154
368,005

t-value
59.22
−5.66
16.45
−43.09
5.57
−5.59
−8.8
2.6
0.57
−13.02
−9.26
2.67
6.14
1.98
−3.33
−5.03
7.38

Without GLB RIDER
Estimate
0.992∗
−0.018∗
0.026∗
−0.004∗
−3.5E-06∗
−0.010∗
0.076∗
0.0230∗
0.147∗
−0.143∗
−0.093∗
0.081∗
0.201∗
0.165∗
−0.045∗
0.232∗
0.206∗

t-value
131.92
−30.42
18.24
−76.1
−8.02
−6.37
18.82
7.27
31.75
−34.42
−23.29
21.68
38.11
44.29
−9.91
48.5
47.94

0.159
272,564

Source: Authors’ calculations. See text for variable definitions.
Notes: OLS regression estimates provided, where the dependent variable is the
percentage invest in the HMR portfolio (see Table 12-1). The first regression is
based on the subsample of variable annuity policies where no guaranteed living
benefits (GLB rider) was selected; the sample pools data from seven firms. The
second regression uses the subsample where longevity-put was selected; the pooled
sample includes 10 companies (see text). We control for company differences
using dummy variables representing the seven companies where many selected
GMIBs. The omitted category is the other three companies.
∗ Significant at the 5% level.

products, however, the age decline is attenuated, and it even reverses at
older ages. These results are generally in line with Figure 12-1.
Besides age, several other variables prove to be significant in explaining
the percentage of an account invested in HMR assets in both models. We
find that men do invest their VAs more aggressively than women, by holding
more equity. VAs, which are part of a tax-sheltered (IRA) plan, have a
lower share of risky assets and a higher proportion of low-risk bonds. This
would be an intuitively pleasing result—that is, bonds are more likely to be
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placed in tax shelters—were it not for the fact that variable annuities are
already tax sheltered. An unexpected finding is that account size (wealth
level) is negatively associated with an allocation to HMR (risky) assets. The
distribution channels variables lead one to conclude that, for investors who
do not select a GLB rider, riskier portfolios result from having financial
planners provide the product. For those who did select the GMIB, however,
stockbrokers are those associated with relatively riskier asset allocations.
In results not reported here, we also show that the company controls are
statistically significant.
To explore further some of these empirical patterns, we next repeat the
regression analysis for the two companies having the largest number of
variable annuity policies. Results appear in Table 12-3, where we see that
the age/equity patterns are similar to those in Table 12-2. That is, the share
of risky assets declines with age much faster for investors who did not select
a Guaranteed Living Benefit. Conversely, for investors who selected GMIB,
the negative age effect is attenuated. Male investors generally allocate more
to risky assets. In terms of account market value, however, the results are
different depending on the company. In company A, the market value
of the account is positively related to the share of risky assets, whereas
in company B, the relationship is negative (similar to the result for the
whole sample). Interestingly—and in contrast to the pooled results—in
both companies the share invested in HMR is higher when the variable
annuity is within tax-deferred account, but only when the GMIB is not
selected. But when the GMIB is selected, the IRA status is associated with
‘more bonds’ and less HMR asset classes.

A Model of Portfolio Choice with a GMIB
Next, we construct a stylized model of portfolio choice in the presence of
a GMIB option, so as to derive a measure for the amount of ‘extra risk’ a
rational (utility-maximizing) investor would be willing to take when granted
a GMIB option that protected him from downside risk. We do so by postulating a generic investor with W0 of initial wealth initially optimally allocated
·∗ to risky assets, and 1 − ·∗ to safe assets. At the outset, we assume that
these allocations take place within a VA but one which lacks extra riders.
The risky and safe assets correspond to the HMR and LR funds described
in the earlier section. By selecting this particular allocation, assumed to be
optimal, the investor has revealed his explicit risk preferences. We further
assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and lognormal asset returns,
as per Merton (1969), the implied coefficient of relative risk-aversion „ will
be equal to (Ï − r )/Û2 , where Ï is the expected return, Û is the volatility and
r is the risk-free rate of return. For example, an investor with a preexisting
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−0.7
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0.005∗
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−0.059∗
0.236∗
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0.217∗
0.239∗
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Significant at the 5% level.

286 of 294

∗

(Typeset by SPI, Delhi)

Notes: OLS regression estimates provided, where the dependent variable is the percentage invest in the HMR portfolio (see
Table 12-1). The first regression for each company is based on the subsample of variable annuity policies where no guaranteed
living benefits (GLB) were selected. The second regression is based on the subsample from the same company where longevityput was selected. While some coefficient signs vary depending on the specific company studied, note that the age variable is
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0.639∗
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0.004∗
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Intercept
LOGACC
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AGE
AGE2
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STBR
FINPL
Adjusted R2
No. of
observations

Variable

Table 12-3 Factors Associated with the Fraction of the VA Account Held in High or Medium Risky (HMR)
Assets: Multivariate Regression Results for Companies A and B Separately
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allocation of 50 percent HMR and 50 percent LR reveals a risk aversion
of exactly four, when the expected return from the HMR investments
is 9 percent, the volatility is 15 percent and the risk-free (LR) rate is
4.5 percent.
We then take this so-called ·∗ ⇒ „ investor and evaluate how he might
change his allocation to the HMR asset class, if he were to hypothetically
be granted the annuity put option underlying the GMIB. More specifically,
let ·∗∗ denote the new (presumably) optimal allocation to the HMR asset
class when the GMIB is ‘wrapped’ around the investment account. Recall
that the ·∗ is the original (optimal) allocation in the absence of this put
option guarantee. The difference between ·∗∗ and ·∗ , which we define as
ε, is the incremental allocation that is theoretically justifiable, based on
the presence of the GMIB. We seek to investigate the behavior of this ε
quantity as a function of the various underlying contractual parameters,
such as the strike price of the embedded option, the preexisting allocation
·∗ , and other exogenous capital market parameter assumptions.
Recall the GMIB guarantees the ability to convert or annuitize (in
the worst case scenario) the guaranteed amount W0 e ÁT at a prespecified
rate denoted by g x , where Á is a guaranteed investment return and T is
the contract horizon. Alternatively, of course, the investor can annuitize
the account value W̃T at the then-market rate denoted by āx . The quantity
W̃T is obviously unknown in advance and depends on both the selected
allocations of the investor and the random performance of underlying
market sub-accounts. The subscript x on both annuity factors denotes the
age at which the life annuity is priced or issued, for example, age 70 or 75.8
Typical market values of āx under the current interest rate environment
might be $10.2 at the age of x = 70, 8.44 at the age of x = 75 and 6.72 at the
age of x = 80. This is the cost of $1 of annual lifetime income, at the various
purchase ages.
One can also think of g x as the strike price of the GMIB option, although
it is not really a put option to sell in the conventional sense, but more of an
exchange rate between a guaranteed amount and a lifetime income. Either
way the GMIB option pays off, or promises lifetime income in the amount:


W0 e ÁT W̃T (·)
,
(12-1)
I = max
gx
ax
The justification for this is as follows. If the underlying market and subaccounts perform poorly (i.e., he earns less than Á per annum during the
T-year waiting period), the investor is guaranteed the ability to annuitize
W0 e ÁT at the guaranteed annuity factor rate of g x . On the other hand,
if the market value of the account W̃T (·) at time T is greater than the
guaranteed amount W0 e ÁT , the investor can simply annuitize the (higher)
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account value, at the-then market annuity rates āx . In fact, he does not
have to purchase this life annuity from the company that issued the GMIB
at all. Instead, he could take his money anywhere and annuitize in the open
market.
Note also that W̃T (·) is partially under the control of the investor and
depends on the asset allocation vector ·, which is to be determined.
Another way to express this quantity is W̃T (·∗ + ε), where ·∗ was the original
allocation in the absence of the GMIB option. Finally, we multiply the
guaranteed lifetime income denoted by I , by the then-market annuity
factor āx to convert this flow into a lump-sum value at the horizon time
T. The objective is to locate an asset allocation vector ·∗∗ , or incremental
allocation ε that maximizes expected utility of wealth:
U ∗∗ = max· E [U (I āx )]

(12-2)

The intuition is as follows. Imagine there is a liquid secondary market for
guaranteed lifetime income. In theory, the annuitant could de-annuitize
the guaranteed income I and obtain a lump sum in the amount of I āx .
Thus, the true expected utility of wealth is as displayed in Equation(12-2).
Indeed, if the option expires out-of-the-money and the market value of the
lifetime income W̃T (·)/āx is greater than the guaranteed amount of lifetime income W0 e ÁT /g x , the mark-to-market value is simply W̃T (·) itself. On
the other hand, if the option expires in-the-money, the guaranteed lifetime
income will kick in and provide income in the amount of W0 e ÁT /g x and
the market value of this income stream will be: āx W0 e ÁT /g x . The objective
then is to find an asset allocation that maximizes the expected utility of this
uniquely defined wealth.
Under the (new) optimal allocation, the expected return from the investment account will be ·∗∗ Ï + (1 − ·∗∗ )r − f , where Ï denotes the expected
return from the HMR funds, r denotes the LR rate, and the new symbol f
denotes the extra fee (a.k.a. mortality and expense charge) for the GMIB.
The optimal allocation and the incremental justifiable risk allocations have
been generated using a simulation approach, since an analytic approach is
impossible and a numerical implementation is equally cumbersome. More
specifically, our computational approach conducts simulations for which
the GMIB annuity factors g x are within the vicinity of market annuity
factors āx , which can be viewed as a fair GMIB case. We also generated a
few in which the GMIB annuity factors were set back relative to marketbased annuity rates, so that: g x < āx . For the majority of our simulations,
we assumed that the guaranteed return Á embedded within the GMIB
was 6 percent per annum. Finally, we start with a 55-year-old investor who
purchases a GMIB with a 15-year horizon. At the age of 70, he plans with
100 percent certainty to annuitize the account, either under the guarantee
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Table 12-4 Optimal Allocations to GMIB Option
% in HMR
Without
GMIB ·∗

Implied Risk
Aversion „

% in HMR
with GMIB

GMIB Annuity Factor g 70 = 15
30
6.67
100
40
5.00
100
50
4.00
100
GMIB Annuity Factor g 70 = 20
30
6.67
40–50
40
5.00
70–100
50
4.00
100
GMIB Annuity Factor g 70 = 25
30
6.67
35–40
4
5.00
50–60
50
4.00
70–100

CE with
GMIB (%)
U −1 (U ∗ )

CE without
GMIB (%)
U −1 (U ∗∗ )

230
250
260

140
17
210

200
220
240

200
200
210

200
210
230

200
210
220

Source: Authors’ computations.
Note: This table illustrates the change in optimal asset allocation when
a GMIB is offered on a VA account, as a function of the GMIB annuity
factor. For example, an investor with a 40% allocation to risky equity
(defined as HMR) reveals a coefficient of relative risk aversion of five.
If this individual is offered a GMIB option at the price of $20 per dollar
of lifetime income, he will change his allocation to something between
70% and 100% HMR because of the downside protection. This investor
will also experience an increase in certainty equivalent (CE) utility from
200% of initial wealth to 220% of initial wealth. In other words this
particular GMIB is welfare enhancing. The underlying parameters were
calibrated to fit the historical risk and return parameters of the variable
annuity sub-accounts.

(if the HMR asset earns less than 6 percent over the next 15 years) or under
the market rates, generating lifetime income of I .
The results for the allocation ·∗∗ , which maximizes the CRRA utility
function relative to the original allocations ·∗ , appear in Table 12-4. One
striking feature is that the ‘positivity’ of the ε variable—the justification for
additional risk exposure—depends on the strike price of the option. The
strike price within a GMIB is not immediately obvious and unrelated to the
contract’s guaranteed investment return (Á) was in the vicinity of 6 percent
for most of our examples. (Note that sometimes this is expressed with
simple compounding, in which case the value must be converted to the true
annualized return.) Our point here is more than just that the ‘devil is in the
details.’ Rather, there can be remarkable heterogeneity between various
GMIB contract provisions that all appear to offer a 6 percent guaranteed
return.
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In the course of extensive simulations to locate the optimal allocation,
several interesting results were observed. First, in many instances, the optimal allocations are ‘corner solutions.’ What this means is that when the
GMIB annuity factor is favorable to the policyholder, he tends to take on as
much risk as allowed by the contract. In a sense, the policyholder has been
granted a put option and he maximizes the personal value of this option
by taking on as much risk as possible. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence presented above (though it assumes full annuitization which we
are unable to determine given our data). On the other hand, when the
contractual provisions are less favorable, that is, with a higher parameter
value of g x , the optimal allocations in the presence of the GMIB are no
longer corner solutions. In some cases, the additional risk exposure levels
are only on the order of 5–10 percent.

Conclusion
Portfolio choice and optimal asset allocation over the life cycle are topics
that continue to attract both academic and practical interest. This chapter
examines how actual allocations to risky assets change when individuals are
given ‘downside protection’ in the form of options to anuitize. Specifically,
we assess asset allocation inside variable annuity products in which certain
insurance riders are available that give investors the option to annuitize
at some favorable rate. The data-set we use includes over half a million
policyholder accounts, from age 40 to 80, and it permits us to observe their
asset allocations, and whether certain riders were selected.
We show that individuals will invest more aggressively when they are
granted this type of put option. Indeed, to anyone trained in the valuation
and pricing of American-style derivative securities, this notion is straightforward. However, what is less obvious is that these put options are not
money-back guarantees but rather they are contingent on annuitization. In
other words, the only way to exercise this put is to irreversibly annuitize the
contract (at the strike price) in exchange for lifetime income. Thus, if there
is some exogenous propensity to avoid annuitization despite its welfareenhancing properties, it remains to be seen whether these put holders will
in fact exercise their options if-and-when they expire in the money.
Our simple model of optimal asset allocation within a GMIB structure
only scratches the surface of more accurate representations of the dynamic
control problem. Future research should to incorporate the American-style
optionality of when to annuitize, as well as the stochasticity of interest rates
and perhaps even the credit risk of the insurer, in the event the market
collapses. Nevertheless, our result appears robust: more risk is acceptable
provided the strike price is sufficiently near the money.
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Notes
1

This research sits squarely within the portfolio choice literature since we are
investigating optimal asset allocations in the presence of various guarantees. We
are aware, of course, that in some cases additional risky asset exposure might not be
justified.
2
The GMIB is closely related to the GMWB, which is not the focus of this analysis.
The latter is yet another form of put option contained and selected within many
variable annuities. Milevsky and Salisbury (2006) provide a separate analysis of
GMWB-based products. Both GMIB and GMWB fall in the category of Guaranteed
Living Benefits (GLB). A GLB rider is essentially an insurance rider which provide
some sort of portfolio insurance for a VA policyholder, but only once the variable
annuity is converted into income.
3
Thus, for example, Goetzmann (1993), Yao and Zhang (2005) as well as Cocco
(2005) focus on the role of the housing portfolio; Campbell and Cocco (2003) focus
on optimal mortgage choices; Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006) examine portfolio
choice in defined contribution pension plans, Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997)
assess the role of DB pensions, while Dybvig and Liu (2004), and Bodie et al.
(2004) model the impact of flexible retirement dates; Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) and Viceira (2001) stress the impact of aging; Faig and Shum (2002)
are motivated by the demand for illiquid assets; Koo (1998) as well as Hakansson
(1969) and Davis and Willen (2000) model the role of labor income; Dammon,
Spatt, and Zhang (2001) focus their attention on capital gains and income taxes;
Heaton and Lucas (2000) focus on the role of background risk. Others go back
to basics and extend portfolio choice models to include more sophisticated (and
realistic) processes for investment returns, such as Chacko and Viceira (2005) or
time-varying and mean-reverting risk premiums, such as Kim and Omberg (1996)
or Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003).
4
See, for instance, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Horneff et al. (2007);
Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996); Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); and
Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
5
See, for instance, Bodie and Crane (1997), VanDerhei et al. (1999), Agnew, Au: Please check
the change in
Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), and Curcuru et al. (2007).
6
Examples of these would include Yoo (1994), Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001), year.
and Faig and Shum (2006). It is important to remind the reader that Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004) show that the age to equity share profile is sensitive to the model specification. In fact, any regression explaining portfolio choice with age can include
only two of the possible three variables: age, time, and cohort. While Ameriks and
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Zeldes (2004) find a hump-shaped relationship in a regression with age and time
effects, they report an increasing allocation to stocks/equity with age in a regression
with age and cohort effects. The majority of researchers, however, consider a cohort
effect the least significant among the three and make the assumption that it is equal
to zero.
7
To assess whether regression results overall are different for GMIB selectors versus
nonselectors, we combine the two subsamples into one pooled sample and cannot
reject the hypothesis that the age differences are statistically significant.
8
We refer the interested reader to Milevsky (2006) for a detailed explanation of
the actuarial pricing underlying the annuity.
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